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they are no more favourable than those which it is 
reasonable to expect the company to have offered to 
a person who is unconnected with the company. To 
determine this normality, the judges will pay heed to 
the terms of similar contracts, not only in the 
company in question but also in other companies 
working in the same field. 
[C.A. Paris, 20 November 1998] 
Silent misrepresentation 
Transfet· of shat·es, voidance, misrept·esentation 
A representation is a statement of fact made by one 
party to the contract (the representor) to the other 
(the representee) which is one of the reasons that 
induces the representee to enter into the contract. A 
representation normally assumes an active form, but 
in French law, it can also be implied from silence. It is 
the duty of a contracting party to disclose material 
facts that are within his own knowledge and which 
might be a determining factor in the mind of the 
other contractor. Failure to disclose such facts gives 
the right to avoid the contract. Deception affords a 
ground for relief with mere silence, even where it is 
not due to misleading conduct. This is a very general 
rule of the law of contract, but courts apply it very 
often to transfers of shares. 
Two would-be pizzai·olos had bought all the shares 
in a small company owning and running a pizzeria. 
But as soon as they took over the restaurant, they 
were informed that all the people who lived in the 
block of flats above and around the pizzeria had 
many times complained because the ventilation 
system was not up to standard and was even so 
utterly inefficient that they all enjoyed the smells and 
fumes coming from the restaurant's kitchen. Running 
this pizzeria without carrying out expensive 
improvements would have been illegal. The court 
decided that the company's sole purpose was to run 
this restaurant, but the purchasers could not possibly 
do so. Yet, if they had bought all the shares in the 
company, it was only because the vendor had not 
disclosed the fact that the restaurant was actually 
unfit. This fraudulent reticence related to a fact 
which, should the purchasers have been aware of it, 
would have led them to consider the sale very 
differently. The court therefore avoided the transfer 
of shares. 
The court's actual statement was that the 
concealed fact would have reduced the price of the 
shares. This roundabout reason was useless: 
concealing the fact that the restaurant was unfit for 
business was a sufficient reason to avoid the transfer. 
On the contrary, talking about the price of the shares 
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could have been counteractive. Mistakes can- as far 
as movable possessions are concerned - at times 
vitiate a contract, except where the mistake concerns 
the price of the thing sold. 
An interesting vindication asserted by the 
defendant was that he had promised to pay for the 
company's liabilities, should the new shareholders 
discover that these liabilities exceeded 10.000 FF. 
(£1000). But the judges observed that the pizzeria 's 
unsuitability could not be regarded as a liability. In 
any case, even if only actual liabilities had been 
concealed, this silent misrepresentation, this 
reticence, would still have vitiated the contract, 
which could have been avoided although the 
transferor had promised to make good these 
liabilities. 
Malta 
[C.A. Paris, 18 November 1998] 
Dr Andrew Kirsch 
Bordeaux 
Banking Act 1994- New Regulations 
Passed 
Banh.ing Act - Criminal Offences; Ut1.licensed 
Banking, Failure te Comply With Lawful 
Requi1·ement of Banking Authorities 
New regulations issued by the Minister of Finance 
lay down penalties for criminal offences and 
administrative defaults. 
In exercise of his powers under section 35 of the 
Banking Act 1994, the Minister of Finance has issued 
regulations laying down the penalties for criminal 
offences and administrative defaults in violation of 
the provisions of the Act. These regulations, 
designated the Penalties for Offences Regulations, 
1999, were published in the Official Gazette as Legal 
Notice 155 some weeks ago. 
Section 35 of the Banking Act lists a number of 
transgressions which amount to criminal offences. 
These offences are enforceable by prosecution before 
the criminal courts. They include the carrying on of 
the business of banking without the necessary licence 
from the competent authority and failure to comply 
with any lawful order or requirement of the 
competent authority or of the Financial Services 
Tribunal. The Act required the Minister to issue 
regulations prescribing penalties for these offences 
within parameters set out in section 35, namely a 
term of up to two years imprisonment and a 
monetary fine of up to 500,000 Maltese liri (one 
Maltese lira is roughly equivalent to three US 
dollars.) The maximum penalty has been attached to 
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a conviction for carrying on banking actlvltles 
without a licence. Very high penalties have also been 
established for a bank's failure to inform the 
competent a uthority that it is likely to become unable 
to meet its obliga tions or that it is abo ut to suspend 
payment. 
The regulations also establish the administrative 
fines that the competent authority may impose on a 
licenceholder for breaching its licence or the 
provisions of the Act. These transgressions do not 
amount to criminal offences and the penalties may be 
imposed by the competent authority without 
recourse to a cour t hearing. Twenty-three 
administrative offences are listed in the regulations, 
and these include failure to pay the licence as and 
when due, failure to appoin t an a uditor, failure to 
submit information as prescribed, fa ilure to comply 
with minimum liquidity ratio requirements . Most of 
the fines are chargeable on a daily default basis, but 
section 35 imposes a ceiling of 50,000 M altese liri. 
Thus, the failure to abide with the conditions or 
restrictions of a licence is punishable by a fine of 100 
Maltese liri for every day that the defa ult persists. 
The Act provides for the possibility of an appeal by a 
licenceholder to the Financial Services Tribunal from 
a decision of the competent authority imposing an 
administrative penalty. 
(Note: The Banking Act is currently administered 
by the Central Bank of Malta as competent authority 
appointed by the Minister of Finance. The 
Government's stated policy is that responsibility for 
banking supervision will in the near future be 
transferred to the Malta Financial Services Centre). 
Company Law - Case Law 
Protection of shareholders against unfair prejudice-
order unde1· section 402 of Companies Act 1995; 
50 per cent shareholder; cause of dissolution under 
section 214- gmunds of sufficient gravity 
Two individuals formed a company. Both held 
half the share capital and served as the company's 
only two di rectors. The Plaintiff was one of these 
shareholder-directors, and he submitted an 
application to the court requesting it to make such 
orders as it may think fit in terms of section 402 of 
the Companies Act 1995. Briefly, this section seeks 
to provide a remedy to a shareholder who complains 
that the affairs of a company are being conducted in 
a manner that was 'oppress ive, un fairly 
discriminato ry against, or unfairly prejudicial to a 
member or members'. T he law requires the court to 
intervene and to issue an order if it finds that 'the 
complaint is well-founded and that it is just and 
equita ble to do so'. The court may issue any order 
regula ting the 'conduct of the company's affairs in 
the future', and it may even decide to order the 
dissolution and winding-up of the company. 
During the court proceedings in this case, ample 
proof was provided that the two shareholder-
directors had fa llen out with each other leading to 
prolonged and serious d isagreements which greatly 
hampered and eventually halted the company's 
operations. 
The court established that the company had 
become practically inoperative and could not 
function as a result of the worsening relationship 
between the only two shareholders, which had led to 
several grave incidents. Conflicting instructions had 
been given to employees ruining relations with the 
company's clients. No meeting of the directors or a 
general meeting had ever been held. There were 
reciprocal accusations of wro ngdoing. It was also 
shown that the defendant shareholder-director had 
set up a new company and had poached employees 
and clients. 
The defendant conceded that the 'affectio 
societatis' was completely lacking and that the parties 
did not trust each other. H owever, he pleaded that 
section 402 was not applicable in the circumstances 
for three reasons: 
(a) this section was concerned with the relations 
between a shareholder and a company, and not 
the relations between a shareholder and another 
shareholder; 
. (b) the defendant company had not taken any steps 
that could be qualified as oppressive or unfairly 
discriminatory against or prejudicial to a 
shareholder; 
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(c) this section does not extend to instances w here 
the shareholder has equal shareholding as the 
defendant. 
The court disagreed with defendant and held that 
a remedy under section 402 was available to 'any 
member of the company' who suffers prejudice as a 
result of the manner in which the company, through 
its directors, was conducting its business. The court 
fo und tha t the failings of the company's board of 
directors had directly caused the closure of the 
company's operations, and that the company had -
owing to the behaviour of its shareholders and its 
directors - fa iled to protect and to promote its own 
interests, thereby also endangering rhe legitimate 
in terests and expectations of the shareholders. 
Accordingly, the court ordered the dissolution and 
winding-up of the defendant company, and 
appointed a liquidator. ft is interesting to note that ~1t 
no stage of the proceedings was any reference made 
to section 214 of the same Act, which lists the causes 
